Minggu, 25 November 2012

Knowledge can direct to a theoretical or practical understanding

Know-how is a familiarity, understanding or understanding of someone or something, such as facts, information, descriptions, or skills, which is obtained through experience or education by perceiving, discovering, or learning.

Knowledge can direct to a theoretical or practical understanding of a subject. It could be implicit (as with practical skill or expertise) or explicit (as with the theoretical understanding of a subject); it can be more or less formal or thorough.[1] In idea, the study of knowledge is known as epistemology; the thinker Plato famously defined knowledge as "justified true belief", though "well-justified true belief" much more complete as it makes up about the Gettier problems. Yet , several definitions of knowledge and theories to describe it exist.

Understanding acquisition involves complex intellectual processes: perception, communication, and reasoning; while knowledge is also considered related to the capacity of verification in human beings

The eventual demarcation of idea from science was made possible by the concept that philosophys core was "theory expertise, " a theory distinct from the sciences since it was their groundwork... Without this idea of a "theory of knowledge, " it is hard to assume what "philosophy" could have been in the age of modern science.

-- Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Reflection of Mother nature
The classification of knowledge is an issue of ongoing issue among philosophers in the field of epistemology. The classical definition, described but is not finally endorsed by Bandeja,[3] specifies that the statement must meet 3 conditions in order to be considered knowledge: it must be justified, true, and believed. Some declare that these conditions are not sufficient, as Gettier case examples allegedly illustrate. There are an amount of alternatives proposed, including Robert Nozicks arguments for a requirement that knowledge tracks the truth and Simon Blackburns additional need that we do not want to say that those who meet any of these conditions through a defect, flaw, or failure have knowledge. Rich Kirkham suggests that our meaning of knowledge requires that evidence for the belief necessitates its fact.[4]

In contrast to this method, Ludwig Wittgenstein observed, following Moores paradoxon, that one can say "He believes it, but it isnt so, inch however, not "He knows it, but it isnt so. "[5] This individual goes on to consider these do not match distinct mental states, but instead to distinct ways of discussing conviction. What is different this is not the mental state of the speaker, but the activity in which they are engaged. For example, on this account, to know that the pot is boiling is not to be in a specific state of mind, but to perform a particular task with the assertion that the kettle is boiling. Wittgenstein sought to bypass the difficulty of definition by looking to the way "knowledge" is employed in natural languages. This individual saw knowledge as a case of a family resemblance. Following this idea, "knowledge" has been reconstructed as a cluster idea that remarks relevant features but which is not adequately captured by any definition. klasifikasi pengertian

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